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FIDUCIARIES AND FEES: 
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver*
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article focuses on problems that arise in connection with the 
representation of plaintiffs by lawyers who charge contingent fees.  These 
problems require clear thinking about the boundary that separates matters to 
which lawyers’ fiduciary responsibilities apply from other matters to which 
they do not.  On the one hand, the fiduciary duty encourages lawyers to 
serve clients well by requiring lawyers to pursue clients’ interests 
exclusively.  In matters to which the duty applies, lawyers must be 
“disinterested”1
On the other hand, contingent fee contracts encourage lawyers to serve 
clients well by making successful representation profitable for attorneys.  
Because contingent-fee lawyers earn more when their clients recover larger 
sums, they have incentives to treat their clients well.  For contingent fee 
arrangements to work, however, lawyers must collect fees and expense 
reimbursements from clients at the end of the day.  This obviously makes 
lawyers better off at clients’ expense. 
—they must pursue clients’ interests exclusively and must 
keep themselves free of, or obtain clients’ informed consent to, conflicting 
interests and other pressures that might tempt them to act disloyally.   
Other actions associated with the collection of compensation also 
evidence this conflict.  For example, lawyers may secure payments by 
threatening to withdraw, by suing clients, by asserting liens on clients’ 
property, and by using confidential information against clients in legal 
 
*  Lynn A. Baker holds the Frederick M. Baron Chair in Law, School of Law, University of 
Texas at Austin. Charles Silver holds the McDonald Chair in Civil Procedure, School of 
Law, University of Texas at Austin.  This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review 
Symposium on Civil Procedure and the Legal Profession.  The authors are grateful to 
Howard Erichson for inviting us to participate in the Symposium and to Deborah DeMott for 
providing us with a draft of her work-in-progress entitled “Fiduciary Boundaries.”  
 1. See Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 9–10 (2000) 
(noting that the “core obligation” of the fiduciary/trustee is “to promote the interests of the 
beneficiaries,” and “[m]ost important of all the ancillary obligations, he must act 
disinterestedly.  The obligation to act disinterestedly is often put as an obligation not to profit 
from the trust”); see also Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary 
Obligations, in MAPPING THE LAW:  ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER BIRKS 577, 578 (A. 
Burrows & Lord Rodger of Earlsferry eds., 2006) (describing Birks’ notion of the fiduciary’s 
“duty of disinterestedness” as “‘parasitic’, in that it existed to ensure that in certain sensitive 
situations self-interest would not interfere with correct performance of the duties of the 
fiduciary ‘to preserve and promote’”). 
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proceedings.2
Obviously, the fiduciary duty permits contingent-fee lawyers (and other 
fiduciaries, including lawyers who work for flat fees or at hourly rates) to 
collect compensation.  Lawyers have been charging clients fees for 
centuries.  The matter could not be otherwise.  A prohibition on fee 
collection (whether imposed by the common law or any other source) 
would quickly cause the legal profession to disappear. 
  Lawyers may also use non-payment of fees as a reason for 
withdrawing from a representation.  Although withdrawal may not help 
lawyers collect compensation, it gives lawyers leverage over clients and  
demonstrates that lawyers may properly put their own interests ahead of 
their clients’ interests on certain occasions. 
Yet, the boundary that separates the area in which the contractual right to 
payment operates from the area in which the fiduciary duty applies is 
contested and, as a result, the propriety of actions associated with fee 
collection is disputed.  Consider the exception to the confidentiality 
requirement that allows lawyers to reveal confidences in suits brought to 
collect fees.  Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American 
Law Institute endorse the exception,3 but the American Lawyer’s Code of 
Conduct (ALCC) rejects it.  As Professor Monroe Freedman, a pioneer of 
legal ethics in the United States and the primary drafter of the ALCC points 
out, the ALCC “expressly forbids a lawyer to reveal client confidences to 
collect a fee.”4  Freedman describes the exception permitted by the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers as “an invitation to blackmail,”5 a characterization Professor 
Deborah Rhode also accepts.6
The propriety of other self-enriching actions is also indeterminate.  In 
Evans v. Jeff D.,
  Is the exception a proper incident to the 
collection of contracted-for compensation or an unwarranted expansion of 
permissible actions adverse to a client that exists for no better reason than 
that lawyers make the rules?  Without a theory explaining how the fiduciary 
duty and the right to payment interrelate, it is difficult to know. 
7
 
 2. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (2006). 
 a lawyer who brought a civil rights action on behalf of a 
group of institutionalized children received a highly attractive settlement 
offer that was conditioned on waiver of the class’s statutory right to an 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2010) (permitting a lawyer to 
reveal confidential information “to establish a claim . . . on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (2000) (“A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client 
information when and to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to permit 
the lawyer to resolve a dispute with the client concerning compensation or reimbursement 
that the lawyer reasonably claims the client owes the lawyer.”). 
 4. Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1717, 1719 (2002) (citing THE AMERICAN LAWYER’S CODE OF CONDUCT Ch. 1 cmt., at 
106 (Am. Trial Lawyers Found., Public Discussion Draft 1980)). 
 5. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 146 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
 6. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 113 (2000). 
 7. 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
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award of attorneys’ fees.8
In recent multidistrict litigations (MDLs) and other mass tort lawsuits, 
judges have cut lawyers’ fees, and lawyers have questioned or challenged 
the reductions.  Clients have sizeable stakes in these battles, which, because 
they occur after settlements are negotiated, can put more money in their 
pockets without compromising the quality of the representation.  By 
challenging judges’ power to cut fees and otherwise seeking to enforce their 
contractual payment rights, did the lawyers violate the duty to put their 
clients’ interests ahead of their own?  In the Vioxx MDL, for example, the 
presiding judge ordered that the attorneys’ fees be capped, then ruled that 
the lawyers’ interests conflicted with their clients’ interests regarding 
attorneys’ fees and sua sponte appointed new counsel to represent the 
clients on fees.
  By supporting the settlement, which was good 
for the class, the lawyer sacrificed any legal or equitable right to payment 
he possessed, as the fee award constituted his only possible source of 
compensation.  Did the fiduciary duty require the lawyer to endorse the 
settlement, or could he have rejected the settlement offer and demanded to 
be paid what he was due? 
9
Some states (and now, some judges) cap the fees lawyers can charge, and 
some states (and judges) impose lower caps than others.  Lawyers are often 
aware of these restrictions, which can greatly reduce their compensation.  
When a lawyer may file a client’s lawsuit in any of several venues, some of 
which permit more generous fees than others, must the lawyer choose the 
venue that most severely limits attorneys’ fees if, from the client’s 
perspective, the forums are otherwise equally good?  Must the lawyer tell 
the client about the differing fee caps when choosing among, or 
recommending, forum options?  Or may the lawyer disregard the caps 
entirely, the fee having been set in the retainer agreement and approved by 
the client? 
  Was the order disqualifying the attorneys on the issue of 
fees justified, even though when it was entered not a single client had 
complained about the fees they had contracted to pay their attorneys? 
Lawyers seeking answers to these questions and others will find little 
case law or scholarship on which to rely, and will rightly think that much of 
what they do find is superficial. 
In this Article, we make a preliminary effort to identify a principled basis 
for distinguishing self-interested conduct that violates the fiduciary duty 
 
 8. Id. at 720–22. 
 9. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 607 (E.D. La. 2008) 
[hereinafter Vioxx Fee Cap Order I] (order capping attorneys’ fees at thirty-two percent); 
Order, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter 
Vioxx Disqualification Order], available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/
Orders/TulaneClinic.pdf (order disqualifying Vioxx Litigation Consortium (VLC) from 
representing its clients on the issue of fees and appointing the Civil Litigation Clinic at the 
Tulane Law School to act on the clients’ behalf); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 
650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564–65 (E.D. La. 2009) [hereinafter Vioxx Fee Cap Order II] (order 
reaffirming the initial order capping attorneys’ fees at thirty-two percent, but providing for 
possibility of departures from the cap, upwards or downwards, in “certain rare 
circumstances”). 
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from similar conduct that is a proper exercise or assertion of an attorney’s 
contractual right to payment.  We believe that a start at distinguishing 
properly selfish from improperly selfish behavior can be made by 
examining the reasonable expectations of clients and attorneys.  To find that 
self-interested behavior violates the fiduciary duty, one must believe that a 
client reasonably expects a lawyer to do what is best for the client when 
handling the identified task, regardless of the consequences for the lawyer.  
To conclude that self-interested behavior is proper, one must believe that 
such an expectation by the client would be unreasonable.  Thus, it is proper 
for an attorney to sue a client who refuses to pay a contracted-for fee 
because a client cannot reasonably expect a lawyer to sacrifice a legal right 
to payment for which the lawyer bargained in advance, even though such a 
sacrifice would make the client better off. 
An implication of this expectations-based approach is that attorney-client 
retainer agreements trump the common law fiduciary duty on matters to 
which the contracts properly apply.  Sometimes, applicability will be 
obvious, as when a retainer agreement entitles a lawyer to collect a 
settlement payment on a client’s behalf (an action that helps secure 
payment) and to deduct a contingent fee of a given size.  Other times, it will 
be less clear, as when a lawyer takes a step that is necessary and proper for 
the enjoyment of a contractual right but that is not authorized expressly.  An 
example might be suing a client who refuses to pay.  A contrary rule that 
elevated the fiduciary duty over the contract would prevent contingent fee 
agreements from serving their core function:  aligning the interests of 
clients and lawyers by rewarding lawyers financially for actions that make 
clients better off.  A contrary rule would also ignore the role of contracts as 
sources of information about lawyers’ and clients’ expectations.  By 
entering into a retainer agreement, a client endows a lawyer with legal 
rights against the client.  The only reasonable expectation the client can 
have is that the lawyer will look out for his own interests, not the client’s, 
when handling matters governed by those rights. 
Some activities relating to fees or expenses fall into the fiduciary realm, 
however.  By pursuing their own interests when handling these aspects of 
representations, lawyers would act disloyally.  The distinguishing feature of 
these activities, we contend, is the absence of a connection to language in 
the retainer agreement intended to protect the attorney.  When no 
connection exists, the only reasonable expectation is that the activity is one 
the lawyer must handle with the sole object of benefiting the client.  
Therefore, when handling any aspect of a representation relating to a 
client’s objective, other than an aspect excluded in a retainer agreement, a 
lawyer must be disinterested.  When handling these aspects, a contingent-
fee lawyer may act in ways that enhance his compensation beyond the 
contracted-for amount only as a consequence or side-effect of increasing a 
client’s net recovery.  Actions that enrich lawyers in other ways violate the 
fiduciary duty and are wrongly disloyal. 
On the approach we suggest, the chief difficulty lies in deciding whether 
an action that enriches a lawyer is appropriately connected to an 
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enumerated contract right.  If courts follow our approach, this problem 
should lessen over time.  Lawyers will come to appreciate the importance of 
using contracts to delineate their rights and will make contracts clearer.  
This will also benefit clients by reducing uncertainty about the occasions on 
which lawyers will pursue their own interests. 
Here and throughout, we emphasize the limited nature and tentativeness 
of our position.  Fiduciary law covers an enormous amount of territory, 
including many relationships that bear little resemblance to attorney-client 
relationships.  We disavow any intention of writing about fiduciary 
relationships in general.  We also ignore certain important issues, such as 
how far lawyers can go when using contractual provisions to carve out areas 
in which they may consider their own interests.  Our object is to begin a 
scholarly discussion, not to have the final say in one.  We urge readers to 
keep this in mind when evaluating our conclusions, some of which may 
seem jarring or counterintuitive. 
In Part I, we examine the little existing law regarding the boundaries that 
separate matters to which lawyers’ fiduciary responsibilities apply from 
other matters to which they are inapplicable, and further elaborate on the 
basic principles that we believe to be useful in this area. 
In Part II, we first examine two fee issues that contingent-fee plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have recently confronted which our proposed principles suggest  
should not constitute a breach of an attorney’s fiduciary duties.  Thus, we 
believe that these scenarios fall on the side of permissible fee collection.  
The first issue is whether it is a breach of fiduciary duty for a contingent-fee 
attorney to challenge a court’s sua sponte order reducing the attorney’s fees 
below the amount set out in the attorney-client contract.  The second issue 
is whether, when confronted with a variety of possible venues in which to 
file or settle a case, the attorney has a fiduciary obligation to choose the 
venue that ensures that the client pays the smallest possible fee to the 
attorney.  We go on to examine a third issue of recent interest to contingent-
fee plaintiffs’ attorneys that we believe does constitute a breach of the 
attorney’s fiduciary obligations:  whether it is permissible for the attorney 
to negotiate a settlement agreement with the defendant that obligates the 
client to pay for a service that would not otherwise be properly chargeable 
to the client, such as the resolution by a third party of any Medicare liens on 
the client’s settlement proceeds. 
I.  BASIC PRINCIPLES 
Most agents need to protect their own interests, which, on some 
occasions, may differ from the interests of their principals.  For example, an 
agent with a long-term interest in cultivating a reputation of a particular sort 
may want to refuse to take certain actions that would enable her principals 
to reap short-term gains.  In recognition of this, the law permits agents to 
separate actions that are subject to the fiduciary duty from those that are 
not.  An agent need only delineate the scope of a representation 
contractually. 
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This approach works because the duty of loyalty exists only with respect 
to actions within the scope of the representation.  Agents can therefore 
protect themselves by excluding from the representation those matters 
which, when handling, they desire to put their own interests first.  
Typically, agents do this by negotiating contractual rights for themselves at 
the outset of the relationship with a principal.  This approach gives 
principals notice that they must retain other agents if they wish to have their 
interests represented on excluded matters. 
Normally, lawyers obtain contractual rights to charge contingent fees 
when representations commence.  By doing so, they inform clients that, 
when handling matters relating to fees, they will act selfishly.  Because the 
parties stand at arm’s length at this time, the fiduciary duty does not attach, 
meaning that lawyers can properly use these negotiations to protect 
themselves.10
 
 10. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts since the 1870s. See, e.g., 
Dickinson v. Bradford, 59 Ala. 581, 581 (1877) (“An attorney may, before entering on the 
business of his client, lawfully contract for the measure of his compensation, and any 
contract then made is as valid and unobjectionable as if made between other persons 
competent to contract with each other; but, after the fiduciary relation has commenced, no 
subsequent agreement with his client for compensation can be supported, unless it is a fair 
and just remuneration for his services.”); Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 105 P. 981, 987 (Cal. 
1909) (“The presumption [that the attorney exercised undue influence over the client] does 
not apply to a transaction in which the attorney openly assumes a hostile attitude to his 
client. . . .  Nor is it applicable to a contract by which the relation is originally created and 
the compensation of the attorney fixed.  The confidential relation does not exist until such 
contract is made, and in agreeing upon its terms the parties deal at arm’s length.” (citations 
omitted)); Elmore v. Johnson, 32 N.E. 413, 416 (Ill. 1892) (“Before the attorney undertakes 
the business of the client, he may contract with reference to his services, because no 
confidential relation then exists, and the parties deal with each other at arm’s length. . . .  But 
the law watches with unusual jealousy over all transactions between the parties which occur 
while the relation exists.”). 
  For example, although the lawyers’ fees specified in a 
For more recent decisions on this issue, see, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 527 
F.3d 627, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A trustee owes an obligation of candor in negotiation, 
and honesty in performance, but may negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settler 
or governance institution agrees to pay.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 & 
cmt. f (1959)); id. (“Lawyers have fiduciary duties to their clients but are free to negotiate 
for high hourly wages or compensation from any judgment. . . .  A lawyer cannot deceive his 
client or take strategic advantage of the dependence that develops once representation 
begins, but hard bargaining and seemingly steep rates are lawful.”); Setzer v. Robinson, 368 
P.2d 124, 126 (Cal. 1962) (en banc) (“No attorney could safely or reasonably negotiate any 
fee agreement with a prospective client without some preliminary investigation of the facts 
of the case and a disclosure to the prospective client of the legal steps which in his judgment 
must be taken.  If by the very fact of such investigation and disclosure the relationship of 
attorney and client would thereby be created, the attorney would be placed in the impossible 
position of becoming the prospective client’s attorney while he was attempting to reach an 
agreement with him as to whether he should become his attorney or not.”); see also Lester 
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:  Hamlet Without the Prince of 
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 55 (1989) (“[I]t is a widely held view that fee contracts 
entered into prior to or contemporaneously with the commencement of the attorney-client 
relationship are irrebuttably presumed to be arm’s length transactions, governed by contract 
and not by fiduciary law.” (citations omitted)).   
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retainer agreement must be reasonable,11 retainer agreements negotiated at 
the outset of representations are enforceable and subject to no special 
presumptions that distinguish them from other contracts.  Fees negotiated 
(or renegotiated) post-retention are another matter.  Because a lawyer 
becomes a fiduciary once a representation begins,12 post-retention fee 
negotiations are suspect, and contracts entered into with clients post-
retention are presumptively unreasonable.13
Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P.
  When discussing fees in this 
Article, we assume they are set before a representation formally commences 
and are “reasonable.” 
14 makes the point that pre-
retention fee contracts are like contracts in general.  There, the retainer 
agreement entitled the law firm to a 40% contingent fee unless the case was 
“appealed to a higher court,” in which event the contract set the fee at 
45%.15  After a trial yielded a large verdict for the plaintiffs, the parties 
entered into a tentative settlement.16  Wanting to preserve the option of 
appealing in case the settlement fell through, the defendant filed a cash 
deposit in lieu of a cost bond.17  Believing that this action constituted an 
appeal, the law firm collected the higher fee.18  The clients initially agreed, 
but later sued the attorneys for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary 
duty, among other causes of action.19
Applying ordinary contract law, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the 
fee agreement was clear and that it entitled the firm to 45% of the 
recovery.
 
20  Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant, 
by filing the cash deposit, perfected an appeal and invoked the appellate 
court’s jurisdiction.21
 
 11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2010) (“A lawyer shall not 
make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee . . . .”). 
  Under the plain language of the contract, this 
 12. An attorney may also acquire certain obligations to a prospective client, even when 
no formal retention ensues, such as a duty to keep confidential the information provided by 
the client during the initial consultation. See, e.g., id. R. 1.18(b) (“Even when no client-
lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall 
not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit 
with respect to information of a former client.”).  These situations do not concern us for 
purposes of this Article. 
 13. See, e.g., Boyd v. Daily, 83 N.Y.S. 539, 544, aff’d 176 N.Y. 613 (1903) (“[T]he 
general rule is that as to contracts made between the attorney and client, subsequent to the 
employment, which are beneficial to the attorney, it is incumbent upon the latter to show that 
the provisions are fair and reasonable and were fully known and understood by the client, but 
this rule does not apply to agreements for compensation made between an attorney and client 
prior to the establishment of that relation . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also supra note 10. 
 14. 22 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2000). 
 15. Id. at 859. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 859–60. 
 19. Id. at 860. 
 20. Id. at 861–62. 
 21. Id. at 861. 
1840 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
triggered the firm’s right to the fee increase.22  The clients’ breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the attorneys was dismissed.23
For present purposes, the legal basis for the result in Lopez is more 
important than the result itself.  Whether the firm was entitled to 45% or 
40% of the recovery as compensation was held to be a matter of contract, as 
it should have been.  If a pre-retention contract is to serve any purpose, it 
must vest lawyers with enforceable rights against clients, including rights to 
compensation.  Consequently, collecting a fee pursuant to a contract must 
be a permissible act.  It follows that even if the contract at issue in Lopez 
had entitled the firm to only 40%, whether because the contract was 
ambiguous or for some other reason, the proper result would have been a 
finding that the attorneys breached their contract, and the proper remedy 
would have been contract damages. 
 
Lopez almost says this, but not quite.  The court’s decision to dismiss the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim rested not on a clear legal principle but on 
the manner in which that claim was plead.24  The clients’ complaint 
specified no unique content for the breach of fiduciary duty claim, but 
merely asserted that the attorneys’ alleged breach of contract constituted a 
breach of the fiduciary duty as well.25  The court noted the limited nature of 
the complaint when refusing to grapple with theories that Texans for 
Reasonable Legal Fees (TRLF) raised in an amicus brief.26  TRLF argued 
that the law firm breached its fiduciary duty by charging a fee that was 
excessive, even if contractually specified, and by failing to advise the 
clients that the contractual language had a colorable interpretation that 
differed from the one the law firm applied.27  The court refused to consider 
these assertions, noting that “[w]hether or not [TRLF’s] theories have merit, 
they are not before us.”28
By handling TRLF’s arguments this way, the court left murky waters it 
might easily have made clear.  Suppose the 45% fee was excessive, as 
TRLF claimed.  Would an excessive fee have supported a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim?  No.  Excessiveness can be a matter of contract law, 
which deals with the problem under the heading of unconscionability.
 
29  It 
can also be governed by state bar ethics rules, which require that fees be 
reasonable.30
 
 22. Id. 
  But neither contract doctrine nor a state bar rule can turn an 
excessive fee into a violation of fiduciary duty law.  The unconscionability 
 23. Id. at 862. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. See generally Brief for Texans for Reasonable Legal Fees as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Lopez, 22 S.W.2d 857 (No. 98-0994), 1999 WL 33744062. 
 29. See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir. 
1979) (setting out legal standard of unconscionability as applied to contract for legal fees). 
 30. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2010) (“A lawyer shall not 
make an agreement for, charge, or collect an excessive or illegal fee . . . .”); TEX. 
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04(b) (2005) (setting out “[f]actors that may 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee”). 
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doctrine simply voids the fee provision, limiting the lawyer to reasonable 
compensation.  The state bar rules may support a grievance action and may 
also serve as evidence supporting a civil cause of action that already exists, 
such as an unconscionability claim.  But a violation of a state bar ethics rule 
cannot create a new civil cause of action, which is what a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim would be.31
TRLF was also wrong in contending that the law firm’s failure to tell the 
clients about alternative ways of interpreting the contract supported a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim.  The point of regulating a subject 
contractually is to set it outside the range of activities to which the fiduciary 
duty applies.  In other words, it is to negate any expectation that the lawyer 
will advance the client’s interest with regard to the excluded matter.  In this 
respect, a contractual provision entitling a lawyer to collect a payment from 
a client could hardly be clearer.  It is obvious that such a provision protects 
a lawyer’s interest and that a lawyer will make his own interests paramount 
when the rights such a provision creates are at issue.  Because the only 
reasonable expectation is that a lawyer will advance his own interests when 
collecting contractual compensation, TRLF’s assertion that a fiduciary duty 
attaches to a payment right produces a conceptual muddle. 
  For a breach of fiduciary duty claim to 
exist in this context, the duty of loyalty must apply to contractual fee 
claims.  When fees are set by means of contracts negotiated pre-retention, 
the duty of loyalty cannot govern them. 
TRLF’s position is deeply incompatible with contingent fee 
representations—an unsurprising fact given that TRLF describes itself as a 
tort reform group that was expressly founded to oppose the payment of 
contingent attorneys’ fees in the Texas tobacco litigation.32
 
 31. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl., Scope ¶ 15 (2005) 
(“These rules do not undertake to define standards of civil liability of lawyers for 
professional conduct.  Violation of a rule does not give rise to a private cause of action nor 
does it create any presumption that a legal duty to a client has been breached.”). 
  Contingent fee 
contracts align the interests of plaintiffs and lawyers by taking fees off the 
table.  Once fees are set contractually, lawyers can focus on maximizing 
clients’ recoveries, knowing that their compensation will fall out 
automatically if and when a recovery is obtained.  TRLF would destabilize 
this arrangement by reintroducing fees as a matter for discussion and 
renegotiation on the back end.  Its position in Lopez, for example, would 
have made it harder for the firm to collect the contractual fee by increasing 
the likelihood of a fee dispute and by giving the clients extra-contractual 
grounds to sue—grounds that, in theory, could have led to complete fee 
 32. Texans for Reasonable Legal Fees (TRLF) has formally described itself as having 
been “created in response to the contingent legal fees sought by the lawyers hired by then-
Attorney General Dan Morales in the [Texas] State’s tobacco case” and as “an association of 
business, consumer and tort reform groups” that “seeks public enforcement of rules intended 
to prevent excessive legal fees and public debate over abuses.” See Brief for Texans for 
Reasonable Legal Fees as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Burrow v. Arce, 997 
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (No. 98-0184), 1998 WL 34193038, at *1, *4 [hereinafter TRLF 
Amici Brief]. 
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forfeiture.33  The gambit’s political appeal is obvious.  In cases that are sub 
judice, TRLF appears to be helping the clients by attempting to lower the 
fee.  The destabilizing effect and, ultimately, the disadvantage to clients are 
felt in cases that never make it to the courts because, when contingent fees 
become unreliable and/or unprofitable, lawyers refuse to take cases on that 
basis.34
Although Lopez drew the line between an attorney’s properly self-
enriching behavior and actions subject to the fiduciary duty less clearly than 
it should have, the distinction is sharply made elsewhere.  Contracts may 
contain carve outs for matters other than compensation and, speaking 
generally, the law enforces them.  In Fiduciary Boundaries, Professor 
Deborah DeMott discusses a series of cases in which auction houses, 
relying on contractual provisions, acted to consignors’ detriment or against 
their subsequently expressed wishes, even though the relationship between 
consignor and auction house is one of principal and agent.
 
35  In one case, an 
auction house retained a coin expert the consignor disliked and ignored the 
consignor’s verbal instruction that the expert not be employed.  Citing a 
contract provision that gave the auction house “‘absolute discretion as 
to . . . consulting with any expert,’” the court found no duty to follow the 
consignor’s instruction or even to disclose to the consignor that the despised 
expert was retained.36
 
 33. In Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999), the Supreme Court of Texas held 
that a client can obtain partial or complete forfeiture of attorneys’ fees by proving a breach 
of fiduciary duty, even in the absence of any showing that the attorney’s breach resulted in  
economic harm to the client. Id. at 240.  TRLF submitted an amicus brief arguing in favor of 
this remedy. See TRLF Amici Brief, supra note 
  As DeMott observes, “the consignment 
32, at *23–36.  We submitted multiple 
amicus briefs opposing it. See Brief for Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and Charles Silver as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Burrow, 997 S.W.2d 229 (No. 98-0184), 1998 WL 
35336105, at *6–18; Supplemental Brief for Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and Charles 
Silver as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Burrow, 997 S.W.2d 229 (No. 98-0184), 1999 
WL 35047216; Letter Brief for Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and Charles Silver as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Burrow, 997 S.W.2d 229 (No. 98-0184), 1999 WL 35047215. 
 34. Statistics provide the best evidence of the impact of tort reform campaigns waged by 
TRLF and other groups, and they make it clear that access to counsel has fallen 
precipitously.  A preliminary study co-authored by one of us (Silver) finds that since 2003, 
when Texas adopted a far-reaching package of lawsuit restrictions, the frequency of medical 
malpractice claims has fallen by sixty percent and payments per claim have dropped by 
thirty-three percent, implying a seventy-five percent drop in total payouts attributable to tort 
reform. See Myungho Paik et al., How Do the Elderly Fare in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, Before and After Tort Reform?:  Evidence from Texas, 1988–2007, at 22–23 
(Northwestern Univ. Law Sch. et al., Working Paper No. 09-24, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1605331.  Neither improved access to health care nor reduced 
health care costs offset these losses in compensation. See, e.g., Charles M. Silver et al., The 
Impact of the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap on Physician Supply and 
Insurer Payouts:  Separating Facts from Rhetoric, TEX. ADVOC., Fall 2008, at 25 (finding 
that the supply of physicians in Texas grew more slowly after 2003 than before). 
 35. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Boundaries (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the authors). 
 36. Reale v. Sotheby’s, Inc, 718 N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  One might 
quarrel with some of these results.  For example, the usual rule of agency is that an agent 
may not ignore an instruction from a principal, even if the instruction is unauthorized or one 
the principal promised in advance not to give.  Once an instruction is given, an agent must 
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agreement . . . reliev[ed] the auction house of duties of performance that an 
agent conventionally owes a principal.”37  In another case, a court permitted 
an auction house to enter into a side agreement with a buyer which was not 
disclosed to the consignor and which entitled the buyer to return a painting 
if an expert subsequently determined that it was not the work of the 
attributed artist.38  This agreement with the buyer seemingly conflicted with 
the auction house’s duty of loyalty to the consignor.  In this case, however, 
the court determined that the actions were permissible because the 
consignment agreement gave the auction house discretion to rescind a sale 
and accept the return of the property under certain circumstances.39  In 
consideration of this, DeMott concluded that although “the auction house 
acted in its own interests and arguably at odds with those of the consignors, 
the consignment agreement placed its right to do so outside the scope of its 
agency and its fiduciary obligation to the consignors.”40
The most extreme cases, for present purposes, may be those in which 
lawyers use clients’ failure to pay their bills as a reason for withdrawing 
from representations on the courthouse steps.  Consider the recent case of 
King v. NAIAD Inflatables of Newport, Inc.,
 
41 in which the defendant-
clients were more than $49,000 in arrears.42  After arbitration failed, and 
with a trial impending, the law firm told the clients it would withdraw 
unless they caught up on the past due legal bills.43  The clients neither paid 
the bills nor contested the firm’s motion to withdraw, but the trial judge 
denied the attorneys’ motion, even so.44  Pointing out that successor 
counsel had not been arranged, the trial judge concluded that withdrawal 
would have “‘a materially adverse effect’” on the clients, “‘tantamount to 
leaving [the] clients unrepresented.’”45  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reversed.46  It found that the law firm faced “significant financial burdens,” 
that the firm’s retainer agreement “obligated the clients to pay all invoiced 
costs and fees ‘upon receipt,’” and that the retainer agreement also 
“expressly” recognized non-payment of fees as a basis for “terminat[ing] 
the engagement” and withdrawing.47
 
respect it or withdraw.  This principle was violated when the auction house hired the expert 
the consignor had specifically ruled out. 
  In language that makes the essential 
 37. DeMott, supra note 35, at 11 (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (agent’s duty to comply with all lawful instructions received from 
principal); id. § 8.11 (agent’s duty to use reasonable effort to provide facts to the principal 
when agent has reason to know principal would wish to have them). 
 38. Kohler v. Leslie Hindman, Inc., 80 F.3d 1181, 1184 (7th Cir. 1996); see DeMott, 
supra note 35, at 12–13. 
 39. Kohler, 80 F.3d 1186–88; DeMott, supra note 35, at 13. 
 40. DeMott, supra note 35, at 15. 
 41. No. 2009-141-Appeal, 2010 WL 5129689 (R.I. Dec. 14, 2010). 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *1–2. 
 45. Id. at *2. 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. at *2. 
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point, the court wrote:  “Lawyers are no different from other professionals; 
they are entitled to be paid for their work on a timely basis.”48
The possibility of confining the scope of the representation also accounts 
for the potential of representation agreements to eliminate interest conflicts 
by excluding services in areas where conflicts may exist.  One of us (Silver) 
has discussed this potential at length in the insurance defense context.
 
49
In fact, the connection between the scope of the representation and the 
existence of conflicts is a fixture of legal ethics.  It enables a law firm to 
handle Matter 1 for Client A and Matter 2 for Client B, even though A and 
B are suing each other in unrelated Matter 3.  A firm “may . . . provide legal 
services to both clients in matters [that are] unrelated to the litigation 
because as to those matters the clients’ interests are not in conflict.”
  By 
defining the purpose of the representation as minimizing the loss to the 
liability claimant, a defense lawyer can avoid becoming embroiled in 
conflicts between carriers and policyholders relating to other matters, such 
as settlement and coverage. 
50
 
 48. Id. 
  The 
ability to contractually limit the scope of a representation enables a lawyer 
to represent co-plaintiffs who may have claims against each other, as well 
as against their common defendant, by excluding responsibilities relating to 
the former claims.  Lawyers representing co-defendants may restrict the 
scope of representation to avoid becoming involved in disputes over the 
allocation of any eventual responsibility for settlement payments to the 
common plaintiffs.  At the most general level, all conflict rules contain 
language limiting their application to situations in which lawyers are 
subject to pressures or duties that may prevent them from fulfilling their 
responsibilities to each of their clients.  Because the identified 
responsibilities exist only within the agreed scope of a representation, the 
conflict rules assume that the scope is contractually defined. 
 49. See generally Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional 
Responsibilities:  Part I—Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599 (2000); Ellen S. 
Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities:  Part II—Contested 
Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 29 (2001); Charles Silver & Kent D. Syverud, 
The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995) 
(discussing the manner of determining the scope of insurance defense representations and the 
importance of the scope). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c(iii), illus. 5 
(2000).  This approach is similarly adopted in Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which states that 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest . . . a lawyer may 
represent a client if:  
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;  
. . .  
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation . . .; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2010). 
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II.  THREE PUZZLES REGARDING ATTORNEYS’ COMPENSATION 
In this Part, we examine, and apply our analysis above to, three puzzles 
that contingent-fee plaintiffs’ attorneys have recently confronted regarding 
their fiduciary obligations:  (1) whether attorneys can permissibly challenge 
judicially created fee caps; (2) what factors attorneys can permissibly 
consider when choosing venues when the states in which clients’ cases may 
be filed treat attorneys’ fees differently; and (3) whether attorneys can 
permissibly use settlement negotiations with the defendant to provide for 
payment of third-party service providers, specifically, companies that help 
resolve  governmental liens on claimants’ settlement proceeds. 
A.  Responding to Judges’ Efforts to Reduce Contingent Fees 
In a spate of recent decisions, judges presiding over aggregate litigations 
encompassing thousands of claimants issued orders capping the fees that 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys could charge.51
Second, the fee cuts were substantial.  In the Zyprexa MDL, federal 
district Judge Jack Weinstein limited attorneys’ fees to 20% in the 
approximately 1,000 cases receiving settlements of $5,000, and limited fees 
in the remaining 7,300 or so cases to 35%.
  These orders were striking for at 
least two reasons.  First, the aggregations were not class actions.  Every 
claimant hired an attorney directly and fixed the lawyer’s compensation 
contractually, in most cases providing for a payment that exceeded the 
judicially-imposed cap.  Thus, by capping the lawyers’ fees, the judges re-
wrote thousands of individual attorney-client contracts.  They did so even 
though no client had challenged either the overall validity of a fee 
agreement or the reasonableness of the contracted-for fee. 
52
 
 51. See, e.g., Vioxx Fee Cap Order II, supra note 
  In the Guidant MDL, federal 
district Judge Donovan W. Frank ultimately capped fees for all counsel at 
9, at 565; Vioxx Fee Cap Order I, 
supra note 9, at passim; Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Special Masters’ June 
30, 2008 Report and Recommendation Concerning Individual Contingency Fees, In re 
Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 
2008 WL 3896006, at *8–10 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Guidant Fee Cap Order 
II]; Memorandum Opinion and Amended Order Regarding Determination of the Common 
Benefit Attorney Fee Amount and Reasonable Assessment of Attorney Fees, In re Guidant 
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 
WL 682174, at *20 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Guidant Fee Cap Order I]; 
Memorandum & Order on Fees, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Zyprexa Fee Cap Order]; see also Order Acknowledging, and 
Setting Hearing on, Modified and Improved Agreement of Settlement, In re WTC Disaster 
Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), at 1 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010) [hereinafter WTC Disaster 
Preliminary Approval Order], available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/
cases/show.php?db=911&id=562  (preliminarily approving proposed Amended Settlement 
Process Agreement that included among its “improvements and benefits” relative to the 
agreement discussed at the hearing on March 19, 2010, a “voluntary reduction” of plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees to 25%); Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, In re WTC 
Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), at 56 (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 2010) [hereinafter 
March 19, 2010 Hellerstein Hearing Transcript].  
 52. Zyprexa Fee Cap Order, supra note 51, at 490–91.  Professor Baker served as a 
consultant to various plaintiffs’ attorneys in connection with the Zyprexa litigation and 
settlements. 
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37.18% of the total gross settlement amount, including 14.375% of the total 
gross settlement amount that was reserved for common benefit fees.53  A 
few months later, in the $4.85 billion nationwide Vioxx settlement, federal 
district Judge Eldon Fallon ordered total attorneys’ fees capped at 32%, 
including the payment of common benefit fees,54 which he later set at 
6.5%.55  Most recently, in March 2010, federal district Judge Alvin 
Hellerstein rejected a proposed settlement of approximately 10,000 claims 
filed on behalf of 9/11 rescue and cleanup workers.  Although he agreed 
that the plaintiffs’ lawyers “[were] entitled to a reasonable and perhaps even 
generous fee,” he held that “they [were] not entitled to their contract rights 
of a third, thereabouts.”56  Settlement negotiations conducted in the shadow 
of Judge Hellerstein’s order limited attorneys’ fees to 25%.57
Although one can question the wisdom and the legality of such sua 
sponte judicial fee cuts on many grounds, we reserve those subjects for 
another day.  Instead, using the Vioxx MDL as an example, we focus on the 
ethical position of a lawyer whose retainer agreement with a client specifies 
a 40% contingent fee and who would like to oppose the court’s order 
capping this fee at 32%.  At first glance, this lawyer might seem to have no 
option but to comply with the court’s order.  The lawyer’s clients obviously 
stand to gain from the order, which would reduce the clients’ fee 
obligations by 8%.
 
58
Most lawyers with clients participating in the Vioxx settlement chose to 
comply with the court’s order.  Some questioned whether they could 
ethically oppose a court order that indisputably made their clients better 
off.
  In addition, the settlement was already in place at the 
time Judge Fallon issued the order, so it seems unlikely that the fee cut 
could harm the clients by weakening their lawyers’ incentives to obtain the 
greatest possible recovery for their claims.  If, by complying with the 
court’s order an attorney would make her clients better off, would it not be 
a breach of the attorney’s fiduciary duties to those clients if the attorney 
challenged the order? 
59
 
 53. Guidant Fee Cap Order II, supra note 
  Others may have thought that they would seem “greedy,” and that it 
51, at *6, *10. 
 54. Vioxx Fee Cap Order II, supra note 9, at 564.  Professor Baker served as a 
consultant to one of the Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Counsel in connection with the Vioxx 
settlement. 
 55. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2010 WL 5576193, at *17 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Vioxx Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fee Order] (ordering 
common benefit attorneys’ fees of 6.5% of the $4.85 billion total gross settlement fund). 
 56. March 19, 2010 Hellerstein Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 55–56. 
 57. See WTC Disaster Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 51, at 1–2; World Trade 
Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, as Amended, In re WTC Disaster Site 
Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), at 15 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=911&id=540. 
 58. Here and throughout, we state the percentages that would appear in subtractions.  
Thus, to reduce a 40% fee to a 32% fee, one subtracts 8%.  From the lawyer’s perspective, 
however, the reduction is much larger.  For example, a lawyer with a 40% fee agreement 
whose client recovered $2500 would have earned $1000 before the cap but took home only 
$800 after it, a 20% loss. 
 59. Confidential conversations of various plaintiffs’ attorneys with Professor Baker 
(2008). 
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would be bad for business in the long run, to seek enforcement of their 
contracted-for fees in the face of Judge Fallon’s order, even if doing so 
were ethically permissible.  As a practical matter, Judge Fallon’s sua sponte 
order clearly put all of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a difficult position, 
whatever their legal and ethical options might be.  The attorneys had taken 
clients’ cases and pursued the litigation with the expectation of receiving a 
particular fee if their efforts were successful.  Now, when the litigation was 
at an end, that fee was unexpectedly cut, to their detriment, but to the 
seeming benefit of their clients. 
One group of lawyers working together as the Vioxx Litigation 
Consortium (VLC) did object to Judge Fallon’s fee order and filed a motion 
for reconsideration.60  Thereafter, Judge Fallon issued another sua sponte 
order disqualifying the members of the VLC from speaking for their clients 
on the subject of fees and appointing the Tulane Civil Litigation Clinic 
(TCLC) to act for the clients in their stead.61
Did the members of the VLC violate their fiduciary duties to their signed 
clients by challenging the fee cut?  Many lawyers have defended their right 
to payment against clients’ claims of overcharging.
 
62
There is no question that the VLC lawyers would have been entitled to 
notice and a hearing if any of their clients had sought a reduction in their 
contracted-for fee.
  Given that this action 
is lawful and ethical, how could it be unlawful or unethical for a lawyer to 
challenge a fee cut imposed by a court?  The lawyer’s fiduciary duty runs to 
the client, not the trial judge. 
63
 
 60. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration/Revision of Order 
Capping Contingent Fees and Alternatively for Entry of Judgment by VLC at 2, In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter VLC 
Memorandum on Fee Cap].  Professor Silver served as a consultant to the VLC. 
  In that context, the contracted-for fee would have 
 61. See Vioxx Disqualification Order, supra note 9, at *1–2.  This order also required 
the dissenting lawyers to send copies of Judge Fallon’s orders to their clients, who numbered 
about 5000 in all. Id. at *2.  The charitable view of this order, which, like the first order 
capping attorneys’ fees, was issued without notice or a prior hearing, is that Judge Fallon 
wanted the clients to know what their lawyers were doing and that the clients would be 
represented by the TCLC on the issue of fees.  The uncharitable view is that he hoped to 
dissuade the VLC from challenging his authority to regulate fees by threatening to enmesh 
them in litigation with their clients. 
 62. See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979).  
In Brobeck, Telex, a sophisticated corporation, entered into a written agreement to pay the 
Brobeck firm a $25,000 retainer plus a maximum of $5,000,000 in contingent fees 
depending on various outcomes, in exchange for the firm pursuing an appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court of an $18.5 million judgment against Telex. Id. at 867–69.  Telex paid the 
retainer of $25,000 but, after the successful resolution of the case, refused to pay a bill from 
the Brobeck firm for an additional $1 million.  Id. at 867, 869.  Telex contended that the “fee 
was so excessive as to render the [fee] contract unenforceable,” but the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the fee agreement was enforceable 
and not unconscionable. Id. at 875. 
 63. It is worth noting that none did—no client-initiated controversy relating to any 
lawyer’s fee existed when Judge Fallon issued his sua sponte order cutting fees. See VLC 
Memorandum on Fee Cap, supra note 60, at 5 (“No client complained of the agreed-upon 
fees.  The Court changed the rate of the fee contracts in the [Aug. 27, 2008 Order capping 
fees] absent any expressed dissatisfaction or challenge to their validity by anyone.”). 
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been reduced only if the clients prevailed in their challenge to the fee, and 
only after the affected lawyers had an opportunity to respond to their 
clients’ complaints.  Judge Fallon’s order, in contrast, invalidated the 
attorneys’ contracts and reduced their fees without first affording them an 
opportunity to defend themselves.64  The due process violation was patent, 
as Judge Fallon eventually realized; several months after issuing the 
original fee cap order, he received briefing and heard oral arguments 
regarding the fee cap.65  If the fiduciary duty (or any other ethical doctrine) 
were to prevent a lawyer from having a day in court on a contested 
contractual right, a denial of due process would occur and one would expect 
the relevant law, if challenged, to be struck down.  It would be especially 
odd, and unwarranted, for any law to prevent a lawyer from obtaining 
appellate review of an order entered sua sponte without notice or a hearing, 
for the risk of abuse of judicial power would be especially great.66
At bottom, the suggestion that the fiduciary duty prevents a lawyer from 
enforcing a contractual payment right is deeply confused.  It collides with 
the reality that lawyers assert contractual payment rights against clients 
every day.  When a plaintiff’s attorney receives a settlement check, the 
lawyer normally deducts fees and reimbursable expenses and passes the 
remainder on to the client.  This collection of compensation is the direct 
assertion of the lawyer’s contractual right to payment.  The same is true 
when a lawyer being paid by the hour or on some other non-contingent 
basis sends a client a bill.  The bill is the lawyer’s demand for payment.  If 
the practice of collecting fees from clients ran afoul of the fiduciary duty, 
we would have heard so by now.  The cases would, for example, require 
lawyers to get waivers before sending bills or to advise clients to obtain 
independent counsel before paying.  No such requirements exist; nor should 
they. 
 
It is also noteworthy that although every state’s ethics rules prohibit 
attorneys from taking actions that impair the loyalty owed their clients,67
 
 64. See id. at 18–19 (“The VLC learned of the Court’s decision only after the Court 
issued its Order.  Before that, the VLC did not know that the Court was considering the 
matter.  The VLC is unaware of any notice of this issue as an agenda item or a matter 
otherwise to be submitted to the Court for resolution.”). 
 
 65. The VLC filed a motion on December 10, 2008, challenging the August 27, 2008 
order capping contingent fees, see generally id.  See also Vioxx Fee Cap Order II, supra note 
9, at 551.  Judge Fallon heard oral arguments on April 7, 2009 on the issues raised.  On 
August 3, 2009, he issued an opinion that largely reaffirmed his original order capping fees. 
Id. 
 66. There is no constitutional right to appellate review, even for individuals convicted of 
a crime. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  If appellate review is available for 
any litigants, however, denying it to others without sufficient justification is a potential 
violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. See 
id. (holding that “a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all,” but “a State that does grant appellate review 
can[not] do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of 
their poverty” and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect individuals from 
“invidious discriminations”). 
 67. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 (2005); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010). 
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those rules also permit the attorney to put her own interests ahead of those 
of the client in limited circumstances when a fee dispute is involved.  Thus, 
an attorney is permitted to reveal confidential information from or about a 
client “[t]o the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim or establish a 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
client.”68  And a lawyer is permitted to withdraw from representing a client, 
even if the client will be adversely affected, if “the client fails substantially 
to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services, 
including an obligation to pay the lawyer’s fee as agreed.”69
Even more to the point, the direct collection of contracted-for fees and 
expense reimbursements by an attorney does not seem to entail a conflict of 
interests of the sort regulated by state equivalents to Rule 1.7 of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
 
70  Under this rule, a conflict exists 
when a lawyer’s responsibilities or interests create a significant risk that the 
representation of a client will be materially impaired.  The collection of 
contractual compensation creates no such risk because it in no way limits, 
or even bears upon, “a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out 
an appropriate course of action for the client.”71  Insofar as incentives are 
concerned, contingent percentage fees encourage lawyers to support actions 
that benefit clients because by maximizing the client’s recovery, a lawyer 
also maximizes her own fee.  Fees are regulated, of course.  They must be 
reasonable and, when contingent on results achieved in litigation, they must 
be reduced to writing, signed by the client, and accompanied by a closing 
statement.72
To date, only one appellate court has had the opportunity to address these 
issues in the context of a fee cap imposed sua sponte by a trial court.  In 
2000, the Texas Court of Appeals
  But reflecting the separation between fees and the fiduciary 
duty, the rule that governs fees is not a loyalty rule, and the rule that 
governs current client conflicts makes no mention of fees. 
73
 
 68. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(5) (2005).  
Comment 15 to that rule elaborates: 
 in Houston reviewed a trial court 
A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily must be permitted to prove the services 
rendered in an action to collect it . . . .  This aspect of the rule, in regard to 
privileged information, expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary 
relationship may not exploit the relationship to the detriment of the fiduciary.  Any 
disclosure by the lawyer, however, should be as protective of the client’s interests 
as possible. 
Id. at cmt. 15. 
 69. See, e.g., id. R. 1.15(b)(5).  Comment 7 to that rule underscores the position that a 
“lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses, after being duly warned, to abide by the terms of 
an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees.” Id. at 
cmt. 7. 
 70. See, e.g., id. R. 1.06. 
 71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2010). 
 72. See, e.g., id. R. 1.5; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04 (2005). 
 73. In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), rev’g sub 
nom. Adkins v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., No. 92-24674, 1996 WL 34442697 (D. Tex. Nov. 
18, 1996). 
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decision74 that capped the contractual attorneys’ fees in a mass tort property 
damage settlement at 20% for cases that had not been tried.75  The appeals 
court framed the question presented as “whether, in light of the absence of a 
class action, a trial judge can properly modify otherwise perfectly legal fee 
contracts because the judge concludes it is not ‘fair’ for the attorneys to 
receive the percentage of each recovery that was agreed upon in advance 
with each client.”76  The court overturned the fee cap, holding that “the 
general rule in Texas honoring the sanctity of contracts applies in this 
case.”77
that the individual attorney fee agreements, viewed separately, were 
improper, illegal, fraudulent, excessive, or out-of-the-ordinary.  There was 
no claim [that the plaintiffs’ lawyers] had breached a fiduciary duty, nor 
that any plaintiff was a minor or an incompetent who needed special 
protection from the court.  The complaint in the trial court was that, in 
light of the number of plaintiffs involved in the settlement, [the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were] simply getting too much money, in the aggregate.
  En route to that determination, the appeals court observed that 
there had been no claim in the trial court by any client or anyone else 
78
 For present purposes, the most interesting part of the appeals court’s 
decision was its failure to express any concern that the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
might have breached any fiduciary or other ethical obligation to their clients 
by appealing the trial court’s imposition of fee caps.  Perhaps because it 
was so eager to overturn the fee caps imposed by the trial court, the appeals 
court merely noted in the first footnote of its decision, by way of 
clarification and without apparent concern, that 
 
[w]hile the “named appellants” are the persons who were plaintiffs below, 
the “real appellants” in interest are the attorneys for the plaintiffs.  
Further, while the named appellees are [the defendants below], they are 
not affected by the outcome of this appeal in any way.  The “true 
appellees” are those of the plaintiffs who have a financial interest in the 
outcome of this appeal (who have not settled the attorneys’ fee issue and 
signed releases).79
 The lawyers in the VLC were licensed in Texas and their retainer 
agreements with their clients were subject to Texas law.  Following the 
Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Polybutylene Plumbing 
Litigation, one might therefore have thought that, under Texas law, the 
VLC’s decision to assert its members’ contractual rights to payment did not 
create an interest conflict.  Judge Fallon, however, held otherwise in the 
 
 
 74. Adkins, 1996 WL 34442697, rev’d sub nom. In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 
S.W.3d 428. 
 75. Id.  Professor Silver consulted on the subject of attorneys’ fees with the special 
master appointed by the trial court judge. 
 76. In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d at 436 (emphasis in original). 
 77. Id. at 439.  Although the appeals court acknowledged that the Texas state courts 
have “inherent” powers to regulate the practice of law, the court held that these inherent 
powers “do not include the authority to make substantive rulings on issues such as the 
enforceability or validity of contracts.” Id. at 438. 
 78. Id. at 436 (emphasis in original). 
 79. Id. at 432 n.1. 
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Vioxx litigation, without citing or discussing In re Polybutylene.  When the 
VLC asked him to reconsider his order cutting their fees, Judge Fallon 
entered another sua sponte order in which he wrote as follows: 
Because any additional attorneys’ fees will come directly from the 
claimants’ settlement awards and will result in less recovery for the Vioxx 
claimants, the VLC attorneys’ interests on this particular issue are 
potentially in conflict with the interests of their clients.  It is thus 
appropriate for the Vioxx claimants to have their fee interests represented 
by independent counsel.80
Judge Fallon then appointed the TCLC as counsel for the VLC’s clients. 
 
The order disqualifying the VLC from representing its clients’ fee 
interests is curious.  First, it cites a potential conflict, not an actual one.  The 
usual view is that a potential conflict exists when there is a possibility that 
interests will collide, while an actual conflict exists when possibility 
becomes reality.81  Thus, the literature speaks of potential conflicts 
“ripen[ing] into” actual ones.82
If one assumes that Judge Fallon meant to find the existence of an actual 
conflict rather than a potential one, a second mystery arises.  When holding 
that a conflict existed, Judge Fallon cited no authority.  If a conflict 
(potential or actual) arises when a lawyer asserts a contractual right to 
payment, supporting authority should be abundant because lawyers collect 
fees every day.  Yet, in the order disqualifying the VLC, Judge Fallon cited 
nothing.  We identified a possible basis for this omission in our discussion 
above:  conflicts do not arise when lawyers collect (or seek to collect) 
contractual fees because fee collection does not limit or interfere with a 
lawyer’s ability to represent a client. 
  Given that the VLC had already demanded 
reconsideration of the court’s order, only an actual conflict could have 
existed, if there was any conflict at all.  What further “ripening” was left to 
occur?  The usual view is also that clients can waive potential conflicts.  
This is why lawyers with potential conflicts often continue to represent their 
clients.  If Judge Fallon thought a potential conflict existed, he should have 
given the lawyers in the VLC an opportunity to obtain informed conflict 
waivers from their clients instead of disqualifying the lawyers across the 
board. 
Judge Fallon may have been led astray by his desire to appoint someone 
to oppose the VLC.  Because he raised the issue of fees sua sponte, the 
VLC’s motion to reconsider his order did not set the stage for adversarial 
litigation.  A judge who initiates an investigation into the reasonableness of 
an attorney’s fee without a complaint from a client “casts [himself] in the 
 
 80. Vioxx Disqualification Order, supra note 9, at *1–2. 
 81. See, e.g., Bruce S. Ross, Ethical Issues in Practice:  Important Fiduciary Litigation, 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. EST. PLAN. COURSE MATERIALS J., Aug. 2010, at 5, 18; James Q. Walker, 
Ethics in Business Negotiations, Conflicts of Interest, and Advance Waivers, in STAYING OUT 
OF TROUBLE:  WHAT EVERY ATTORNEY MUST KNOW ABOUT ETHICS 337 (Practicing L. Inst. 
2008). 
 82. Ross, supra note 81, at 18. 
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role of a prosecutor.”83  He “assume[s] the role that the [allegedly 
overcharged clients’] lawyer would have played had they sued [the 
attorney],” as Judge Richard A. Posner has observed.84
When ordering that the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees be capped, Judge Fallon 
explicitly followed the path blazed by Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa 
MDL
  The fee controversy 
in Vioxx thus pitted Judge Fallon against the VLC, an alignment likely to 
create an appearance of judicial partiality.  Wanting to turn the prosecutor’s 
job over to someone else, Judge Fallon may have seized upon the idea of 
disqualifying the VLC and appointing the TCLC. 
85 and also tread by Judge Frank in the Guidant MDL.86  By 
disqualifying the VLC, however, Judge Fallon set out on his own.  The sua 
sponte decisions by Judges Weinstein and Frank to cut lawyers’ fees in the 
Zyprexa and Guidant MDLs also provoked opposition, but in neither 
instance did the court disqualify the dissenting lawyers or sua sponte 
appoint new counsel to represent the dissenting lawyers’ clients on the issue 
of attorneys’ fees.87  Nor did Texas state court trial Judge Russell T. Lloyd, 
who capped attorneys’ fees in the polybutylene plumbing litigation, take the 
further step of disqualifying the attorneys who (successfully) appealed the 
fee cuts.88
The question is thus squarely framed:  Did Judge Fallon err by 
disqualifying the VLC or did the other judges err by failing to find that the 
dissenting lawyers had a conflict on the issue of attorneys’ fees in those 
consolidations?  The question is also urgent.  Just as the actions of Judges 
Weinstein and Frank in Zyprexa and Guidant, respectively, served as 
models for Judge Fallon in Vioxx, judges in future MDLs are likely to 
follow Judge Fallon’s lead. 
 
In our view, there was no conflict of interests requiring Judge Fallon to 
disqualify the VLC.  In challenging the fee caps, the affected attorneys were 
 
 83. United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 84. Id. at 807 (holding that a federal district judge exceeded his authority by compelling 
a criminal defense attorney to return part of the previously paid contractual fee). 
 85. See Zyprexa Fee Cap Order, supra note 51, at 490–91. 
 86. Judge Frank issued a series of fee-related orders in Guidant. See Guidant Fee Cap 
Order I, supra note 51, at *17–20; Order Regarding Requests for Motions to Reconsider the 
Court’s March 7, 2008 Order Regarding Determination of the Common Benefit Attorney 
Fee Amount and Reasonable Assessment of Attorney Fees, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable 
Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB) (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2008); 
Guidant Fee Cap Order II, supra note 51; see also Report and Recommendation of Special 
Masters, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
1708, 2008 WL 3896018 (D. Minn. June 30, 2008). 
 87. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
request for relief from orders capping fees and requiring contributions to common benefit fee 
award); Guidant Fee Cap Order II, supra note 51, at *3 (reporting that the court received 
thirteen letters requesting permission to file motions to reconsider the court’s order capping 
fees at twenty percent). 
 88. Adkins v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., No. 92-24674, 1996 WL 34442697 (D. Tex. 
Nov. 18, 1996), rev’d sub nom. In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 
App. 2000).  Judge Lloyd’s order reducing the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expense 
reimbursements was reversed on appeal. In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d at 
442. 
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not opposing their clients.  They disagreed with Judge Fallon, not with their 
clients.  Moreover, when responding to Judge Fallon’s order, which 
infringed upon their contractual rights, the members of the VLC were 
obviously speaking for themselves and not on behalf of their clients.  They 
were responding to Judge Fallon’s charge that they would violate their 
professional responsibilities by collecting their contracted-for fees.  To see 
that the clients were not involved in the dispute between Judge Fallon and 
the VLC, one need only realize that, had Judge Fallon changed his mind 
and allowed the lawyers to collect their fees in full, the clients would have 
been free to challenge the reasonableness of the fees (and all other aspects 
of their attorneys’ conduct) in a separate proceeding.   
Fundamentally, Judge Fallon’s decision to appoint replacement counsel 
for the clients was unwarranted because the court is supposed to be the 
prosecutor when it exercises its inherent power to regulate attorneys.  For 
example, when a judge holds a hearing following the sua sponte issuance of 
a contempt order, the court does not engage a new lawyer to argue its side 
of the dispute.  The judge becomes the prosecutor and makes the record 
supporting the punishment.89  When issuing his sua sponte order cutting 
fees, Judge Fallon claimed to be exercising his inherent power.90
Judge Fallon’s decision to appoint separate counsel also raised a host of 
serious questions he never addressed.  What was the source of his power to 
saddle the VLC’s clients with new lawyers?  It is one thing to disqualify a 
lawyer, but it is quite another to appoint a replacement.  What authority did 
the new lawyers have to speak for the clients, given that the clients never 
conferred any?  Could the clients have refused representation by the TCLC?  
By asserting that the clients opposed paying the VLC their contracted-for 
fees, was the TCLC putting words into their mouths, given that none had 
actually complained?
  He should 
therefore have retained the position of prosecutor instead of recasting the 
matter as a dispute between the VLC and its clients.  There was no such 
dispute, until Judge Fallon acted in a manner that may have been calculated 
to create one.  There was simply Judge Fallon’s belief that he had the power 
and the responsibility to reduce all lawyers’ fees. 
91
 
 89. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.155 (2004) (describing 
procedure for imposing sanctions). 
  Did the clients have the option of refusing 
representation by the TCLC, and if they did, should the court-ordered 
notices they received have made that clear?  If the VLC had prevailed in its 
 90. See Vioxx Fee Cap Order I, supra note 9, at 612 (“[T]he Court finds that the Vioxx 
global settlement may properly be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the 
Court equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for reasonableness.”). 
 91. The possibility that clients might support the payment of their attorneys’ full 
contractual fee is a documented reality in similar cases, as is evident from the testimony of 
9/11 worker Joseph Greco in the WTC Disaster Site Litigation, where he said: 
[the attorneys] and many other members of their staff have been there for my 
family and myself since day one.  They are constantly calling me for [sic] see how 
I’m feeling and if I need anything.  The compassion, friendship, and hard work 
that they have shown is priceless. . . .  They deserve their fee for all their hard 
work, time, and risk they have spent on the case. 
March 19, 2010 Hellerstein Hearing Transcript, supra note 51, at 9. 
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effort to overturn the order cutting fees on appeal, would the clients have 
been precluded from attacking the reasonableness of the VLC’s fees in a 
later proceeding?  If the TCLC had lost, could the clients have sued it for 
malpractice?  If the clients had wanted to attack the VLC attorneys or their 
contractual fees on other grounds, such as malpractice, breach of fiduciary 
duty, or unconscionability, were they obligated to bring those claims in 
Judge Fallon’s court? 
One could extend the list of unanswered questions, but the point should 
already be clear.  By framing the dispute as one between the clients and the 
VLC instead of as the dispute it actually was—between the court and the 
VLC—Judge Fallon invented a new power and put ordinary procedural 
arrangements to uses for which they are not suited.  One might have hoped 
that matters would have been straightened out on appeal, but because the 
fee dispute was settled, one will never know.  The record of appellate 
review of judicial rulings in MDLs affords little cause for optimism, in any 
event.92
B.  Venue Selection 
  Circuit courts have given trial judges enormous freedom to 
manage MDLs as they wish. 
Another controversial fee-related issue that contingent-fee plaintiffs’ 
lawyers increasingly confront involves venue selection.  After a client has 
retained the attorney at a fee that is a specified percentage of any eventual 
recovery, the prosecution of the client’s claims will require the attorney and 
client to make a number of decisions.  Some of these decisions will involve 
the “objectives” or “general methods” of the representation and will 
therefore be matters over which the client is to have the final say.93
 
 92. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of 
Managing Multi-District Litigations:  Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 
118–19 (2010) (observing that there “appears to be no reported case in which a disappointed 
lawyer appealed an unfavorable appointment decision from an MDL judge, let alone one in 
which an appointment order by an MDL judge was reversed” and noting that lawyers in 
MDLs “refrain from appealing [adverse decisions] partly because they do not wish to 
alienate MDL trial judges, who have considerable power to make life unpleasant for them”). 
  Other 
decisions will involve the “means” by which those objectives might be 
 93. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010) (“[A] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by 
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”); 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(a) (2005) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by 
a client’s decisions . . . concerning the objectives and general methods of 
representation . . . .”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2010) 
(stating that the client has “the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by 
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s professional 
obligations. . . .  With respect to the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take 
such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 cmt. 1 (2005) (“Both lawyer and client have authority 
and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation.  The client has ultimate 
authority to determine the objectives to be served by legal representation, within the limits 
imposed by law, the lawyer’s professional obligations, and the agreed scope of 
representation.  Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about 
the general methods to be used in pursuing those objectives.”). 
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achieved, including “technical and legal tactics”—matters for which the 
lawyer has primary responsibility.94  Although the attorney may exercise 
“very broad discretion”95 with regard to this category of decisions, an 
obligation to “reasonably consult” with the client exists,96 and the attorney 
must also “promptly comply with [the client’s] reasonable requests for 
information.”97
Chief among the decisions to be made regarding “technical and legal 
tactics” and the “means” by which the objectives of the representation are to 
be achieved are the decisions where and when to file the client’s lawsuit.  
Given the goal of maximizing the client’s gross recovery, the attorney can 
be expected to consider a number of factors in deciding where among the 
available options to file the lawsuit,
 
98
 
 94.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Clients normally 
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used 
to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical 
matters.  Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the 
expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.”); 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 cmt. 1 (2005) (“The lawyer should 
assume responsibility for the means by which the client’s objectives are best achieved.  
Thus, a lawyer has very broad discretion to determine technical and legal tactics, subject to 
the client’s wishes regarding such matters as the expense to be incurred and concern for third 
persons who might be adversely affected.”). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.4(a)(2) (2010) (“A lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the client about the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished . . . .”). 
 including:  which venue’s substantive 
laws are most favorable to the plaintiff; which venue is most likely to offer 
a plaintiff-friendly trial judge, jury, or both; which venue already has a 
record of favorable discovery rulings or favorable verdicts in similar cases; 
and which venue is most likely to afford the client the earliest trial date.  
The decision of when to file the client’s case will typically be less complex, 
but will also involve consideration of multiple factors, including the statute 
of limitations in the jurisdiction in which the case is most likely to be filed, 
whether sufficient information about the client’s case has been obtained that 
 95. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 cmt. 1 (2005). 
 96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) & cmt. 3 (2010); see also id. cmt. 5 
(“[A] lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail.  
The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for 
information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interests, and the client’s 
overall requirements as to the character of representation.”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.03 cmt. 2 (2005) (same). 
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(4) (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.03(a) (2005). 
 98. The options for where to file a lawsuit may include the choice of what state, as well 
as whether to file in federal or state court.  All of those options are limited by the relevant 
laws and court rules that will look to certain facts of the case, such as the location of the 
defendant, the amount in controversy, and whether there is “diversity.”  For discussion of the 
strategic use of venue selection in litigation, see Russell J. Weintraub, How Are You Going 
To Keep Them Down on the Farm After They’ve Seen the Conflict of Laws?, 27 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 681, 681 (1996) (contending that venue selection “is a weapon for winning cases that 
otherwise could not be won”). 
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would support a valid cause of action, and whether the litigation of similar 
cases to date has proceeded along a positive path.99
In addition to all of the above, there is a more controversial variable that 
may affect a contingent-fee plaintiff’s attorney’s decision where to file a 
client’s case:  whether the court rules,
 
100 ethics rules,101 or other applicable 
laws102
 
 99. Under some circumstances, an attorney might delay filing a client’s case as a 
strategic decision if there is no concern about the statute of limitations running in the near 
future.  The attorney may be waiting to see how similar cases are faring in various venues 
with regard to discovery rulings and verdicts before deciding where to file the case.  The 
attorney’s discovery to date may suggest that a client’s case is relatively weak, and the 
attorney may delay filing that particular case in order to:  prevent the case from becoming an 
unfavorable “bellwether” case or early trial case for the larger, mass tort litigation; keep 
expenses low; or make it easier and less costly to terminate the representation in the future if 
the attorney determines that the case does not merit further prosecution and/or cannot easily 
be included in a group or “inventory” settlement with the defendant. 
 in a jurisdiction impose a cap on attorney’s fees below the amount 
 100. For example, a New Jersey court rule, titled “Contingent Fees,” states in relevant 
part: 
(c) In any matter where a client’s claim for damages is based upon the alleged 
tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims . . . , an attorney 
shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following 
limits: 
(1) 33 1/3% on the first $500,000 recovered; 
(2) 30% on the next $500,000 recovered; 
(3) 25% on the next $500,000 recovered; 
(4) 20% on the next $500,000 recovered; and 
(5) on all amounts recovered in excess of the above by application for 
reasonable fee in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f) hereof; and 
(6) where the amount recovered is for the benefit of a client who was a minor 
or mentally incapacitated when the contingent fee arrangement was made, the 
foregoing limits shall apply, except that the fee on any amount recovered by 
settlement without trial shall not exceed 25%. 
(d) The permissible fee provided for in paragraph (c) shall be computed on the net 
sum recovered after deducting disbursements in connection with the institution and 
prosecution of the claim, whether advanced by the attorney or by the client . . . . 
. . . 
(f) If at the conclusion of a matter an attorney considers the fee permitted by 
paragraph (c) to be inadequate, an application on written notice to the client may 
be made to the Assignment Judge for the hearing and determining of a reasonable 
fee in light of all the circumstances.  This rule shall not preclude the exercise of a 
client’s existing right to a court review of the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. 
N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7; see also MICH. GEN. CT. R. 8.121 (limiting contingent fees in personal 
injury or wrongful death suits to 33 1/3%); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 691.20 
(2011) (sliding scale limiting contingent fees in cases involving personal injury, wrongful 
death, certain negligence claims, or malpractice claims other than medical malpractice 
claims to 50% of the first $1,000 recovered, 40% of the next $2,000 recovered, 35% of the 
next $22,000 recovered, and 25% on any amount over $25,000 of the sum recovered); 
Leonard C. Arnold, Ltd. v. N. Trust Co., 506 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (Ill. 1987) (upholding 
against various constitutional and statutory challenges a local court rule limiting attorney 
fees to 25% of recovery in settlements of personal injury actions involving minors). 
 101. See, e.g., FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i)(b) (limiting contingent fees in personal 
injury, products liability, and property damage suits to 40% of any recovery up to $1 million; 
30% of that portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million; and 20% of that 
portion of the recovery over $2 million). 
 102. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (West 2010) (limiting contingent fees 
in medical malpractice suits to 40% of the first $50,000 recovered; 33 1/3% of the next 
$50,000; 25% of the next $500,000; and 15% of any amount over $600,000); CONN. GEN. 
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set forth in the attorney-client contract.  These fee caps can significantly 
reduce a contingent-fee attorney’s compensation from the contractual 
amount, as the following example involving the New Jersey court rule on 
contingent fees shows.  Consider an attorney whose client has contracted to 
provide the attorney a fee of 40% of any recovery, with litigation expenses 
to come out of the client’s share of the proceeds.103
Given the substantial sums at stake, especially in high value cases, one 
would expect contingent-fee attorneys strongly to prefer to file cases in 
jurisdictions without fee caps, other things being equal.  Only if the attorney 
believes that a client’s gross recovery is likely to be substantially greater in 
a jurisdiction with a fee cap than in one without a cap, would the attorney 
be expected to prefer to prosecute a claim in the jurisdiction with fee caps.  
Using the example discussed above, an attorney subject to the New Jersey 
fee caps would need to obtain a recovery at least 65% larger—$3,306,665 
versus $2,000,000—in order to receive the same fee that he was entitled to 
under the terms of the attorney-client contract in a non-fee-cap 
jurisdiction.
  If the attorney were to 
obtain a gross recovery of $2 million in settlement for the client’s claim, 
after incurring $15,000 in reimbursable litigation costs, the attorney would 
receive $815,000 under the contract ($15,000 + (.40 x $2,000,000)).  Under 
the New Jersey court rule, however, the attorney would receive only 
$553,667 for the same recovery ($15,000 + (.33 x $500,000) + (.30 x 
$500,000) + (.25 x $500,000) + (.20 x $485,000)).  In this instance, the New 
Jersey fee caps cost the attorney $261,333 in fees. 
104
Of course, under the example above, the client might prefer the fee cap 
jurisdiction to paying the contractual 40% fee, other things being equal.  
Unless the cap reduces the recovery by weakening the lawyer’s incentive to 
work hard on the client’s behalf, the $261,333 savings in attorneys’ fees 
under the example’s application of the New Jersey fee caps is a direct 
 
 
STAT. ANN. § 52-251c(b) (West 2010) (sliding scale limiting contingent fees in personal 
injury, wrongful death, or property damage suits to 33 1/3% of the first $300,000; 25% of 
the next $300,000; 20% of the next $300,000; 15% of the next $300,000; and 10% of any 
amount exceeding $1,200,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (West 2011) (limiting 
contingent fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 1/3% of all damages awarded the 
claimant); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.013(1m) (West 2010) (sliding scale limiting contingent 
fees in medical malpractice cases to 33 1/3% of the first $1,000,000 recovered, and 20% of 
any amount in excess of $1,000,000 recovered, with the fee for the first $1,000,000 
recovered limited to 25% “if liability is stipulated within 180 days after the date of filing of 
the original complaint and not later than 60 days before the first day of trial”); see also 
Zyprexa Fee Cap Order, supra note 51, at 494–96 (discussing various rules and statutes); 
Vioxx Fee Cap Order I, supra note 9, at 615. 
 103. These precise terms are, in fact, frequently seen in attorney-client contracts in mass 
tort litigation in recent years. See various anonymized attorney-client agreements (on file 
with Prof. Baker). 
 104. These numbers assume all of the facts presented above, including a 40% contractual 
fee.  These numbers also critically assume that the portion of the recovery in excess of 
$2,000,000 (after expenses), which is subject to paragraph (f) of the New Jersey rule, would 
be determined by the Assignment Judge to be subject to a fee of no less than 20%. See N.J. 
CT. R. 1:21-7(c), (f). 
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transfer to the client.105
From the above, it appears that when a jurisdiction imposes a cap on the 
contingent fees that attorneys may receive, a conflict is created between 
such an attorney and his client if the latter has previously contracted to pay 
the attorney a larger percentage fee than that permitted under the cap.  Other 
things being equal,
  And even if the recovery does fall, the client may 
still prefer the fee cap state because the reduction in fees may more than 
offset the reduced recovery. 
106
Is it then a breach of the fiduciary duty owed the client if the attorney 
does not file the client’s case in the fee-cap jurisdiction, assuming it is an 
available venue?  If so, is the attorney further obligated to file the client’s 
case in the jurisdiction with the most severe cap on fees, if more than one 
fee-cap jurisdiction is an option? 
 the client can be presumed to prefer to pay the 
attorney a smaller fee and, therefore, to prefer to prosecute his claim in the 
fee cap jurisdiction, while the attorney can be similarly presumed to prefer 
the larger fee available in a jurisdiction without fee caps. 
We do not believe so.  An attorney retained under a standard contingent 
fee agreement does not represent—that is, does not act for—the client on 
the matter of fees.  To the contrary, by setting the fee in advance, the 
agreement (1) encourages the lawyer to maximize the client’s recovery by 
removing fees from further consideration, and (2) establishes that, on the 
subject of fees, the lawyer will advance his own interests, not the client’s.  
An implied obligation to minimize the fee burden, whether by filing in a 
fee-cap jurisdiction or other means, would make hash of the retainer 
agreement and pose serious problems for the attorney.  For example, an 
attorney can always reduce the cost of legal services for a client by cutting 
the fee voluntarily.  Once one decides that an attorney owes a client a 
fiduciary duty on the matter of fees, voluntary fee reductions seem to be 
required, and attorneys’ contractual rights lose their importance. 
Even if one agrees that a lawyer has no fiduciary obligation to file a 
lawsuit in a fee-cap jurisdiction, one may still believe that an attorney 
should disclose the existence and size of caps to the client and let the client 
choose the venue in which the case will be filed.  Under existing law, “[t]he 
guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client 
expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s 
best interests.”107
 
 105. On the potential of fee caps to reduce lawyers’ effort levels and clients’ recoveries, 
see generally Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 
(1996); Michael McKee et al., Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents:  A 
Laboratory Experiment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (2007); Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, 
Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents, 44 J.L. & ECON. 549 (2001). 
  Does this require the attorney to discuss with the client 
the impact that venue choice may have on the attorney’s fees?  Although we 
expect many readers to answer affirmatively, we are inclined toward the 
opposite view. 
 106. As we explain in further detail below, other things are not likely to be equal. See 
infra text accompanying note 109. 
 107. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (2010); see supra note 96. 
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A preliminary question is whether attorneys ordinarily obtain input from 
clients when choosing litigation venues.  Our experience with mass tort 
litigation does not cause us to think they do, but we are not aware of any 
relevant empirical studies.  If venue choice is not a matter on which 
attorneys ordinarily consult with clients, then the belief that attorneys must 
communicate fee-related information when selecting forums would 
establish a new communication requirement. 
More directly, the assertion that lawyers must tell clients about fee caps 
casts lawyers in the role of purveyors of price-related information to clients.  
This is not a role that, to our knowledge, lawyers or other agents usually 
play.  For example, Lawyer A may know that Lawyer B charges lower 
contingent percentage fees, but we know of no legal requirement that 
Lawyer A disclose this information to a potential client when negotiating 
the terms of his retention.  Nor, to our knowledge, are real estate agents, 
other sales agents, or other fiduciaries required to tell clients that cheaper 
service providers can be found down the street.108
Notwithstanding the analysis above, the conflict of interest rules might 
obligate the attorney to provide fee-cap information to the client, or might 
otherwise constrain the attorney’s fee-related decisions, in certain 
situations.  For example, suppose that, ignoring fee-related considerations, a 
client would benefit by having a lawsuit filed in State A rather than State B 
because State A’s laws allow punitive damages while State B’s laws do not.  
Now suppose that State A limits lawyers’ contingent fees, but State B does 
not.  Self-interest might lead the client’s lawyer to choose State B, thereby 
harming the client but preserving the contracted-for fee.  In this context, it 
seems clear that the client is entitled to have the attorney pick State A—i.e., 
the forum that is best for the client on the merits—because the lawyer 
clearly acts on the client’s behalf when filing a lawsuit in a particular 
forum.  The existing ethics rules governing conflicts of interest would 
prevent the attorney from choosing State B.
  Fiduciaries need only 
describe their own charges accurately.  This enables clients to comparison 
shop on their own. 
109
 
 108.  See supra note 
  The principles we propose 
yield the same result.  Both the client and the attorney expect the attorney to 
act in the client’s best interests on all matters not contractually excluded 
from the scope of the representation.  In other words, an attorney who wants 
to avoid filing cases in jurisdictions otherwise advantageous to clients 
which also cap fees must include language in the retainer agreement 
conferring a right upon the attorney to protect his own interests when 
choosing the forum. 
10. 
 109. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2010) (“[A] lawyer shall 
not represent a client if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation . . . will be 
materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(b)(2) (2005) (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a person if the 
representation of that person . . . reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited . . . 
by the lawyer’s or law firm’s own interests.”). 
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Our point is simply that when State B is at least as good as State A on the 
merits, the lawyer has no duty to take State A’s fee-cap into account when 
deciding where to file the case.  Once fees are provided for contractually, 
they are excluded from the scope of the representation.  Consequently, the 
lawyer cannot have a fiduciary duty to protect the client’s fee-related 
interests.  The client cannot reasonably expect the attorney to pursue the 
client’s claim in State A when its laws:  (a) offer no clear benefit to the 
client over those of State B on issues apart from attorneys’ fees, and (b) cap 
the fees that the attorney can charge at an amount below that agreed to in 
the attorney-client retainer agreement. 
In the situation we have described, it might well be prudent for a lawyer 
to discuss the matter of forum choice with the client, even assuming that the 
lawyer has no obligation to do so.  To see why, imagine that the attorney 
filed the client’s suit in State B, the client lost at trial, and the client 
subsequently sued the lawyer for malpractice.  The client could argue that 
the lawyer chose State B to protect his fee, not because the lawyer judged 
State B to be at least as favorable, or possibly better, for the client as State 
A on the merits.  In other words, the client could argue that the lawyer’s 
desire for a higher fee distorted the lawyer’s judgment and caused the 
lawyer to act to the client’s detriment on a matter within the scope of the 
representation.  In retrospect, the choice of State B will seem to have been a 
poor one—the client having lost on the merits there—and the lawyer will be 
at a disadvantage in the malpractice suit.  Better for the lawyer to have 
obtained the client’s informed consent in advance than to be in this 
situation, whether or not a conflict is determined to exist. 
C.  Using Settlement Negotiations with Defendants to Enhance Attorneys’ 
Financial Gain 
We have explored in Parts II.A and II.B the contours of two different 
scenarios under which we believe a contingent-fee attorney may pursue his 
own fee interests without breaching a fiduciary obligation to the client.  In 
this part, we examine one set of circumstances under which an attorney’s 
self-interested actions regarding his fees would run afoul of the principles 
that we set out in Part I. 
Corporate defendants are increasingly concerned to provide in personal 
injury settlements for the resolution of any governmental liens on individual 
plaintiffs’ settlement funds, especially liens held by Medicare.  The 
applicable statute and regulations expose settling defendants to substantial 
penalties if these liens are left unresolved.110  For this reason, settlement 
agreements in personal injury mass tort cases often include lengthy and 
detailed requirements regarding lien resolution.111
 
 110. Defendants, as “primary payers,” can be fined as much as twice the amount owed to 
the agency if Medicare’s reimbursement claim is not satisfied in connection with a personal 
injury settlement. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g)–
(i) (2010). 
  Settlement agreements 
 111. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed 
on the Signature Pages Hereto §§ 12.1.1–3, at 44–45 (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx 
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also typically require mass tort plaintiffs to indemnify the defendant against 
the payment of any additional monies determined to be owed to a 
governmental entity, and to identify any governmental authorities “known 
to them to hold or assert a statutory lien” with respect to the settlement 
funds.112
Lien resolution can be time-consuming and complex.  Governmental 
payers are often slow to respond with statements of the amounts to be 
reimbursed.  And because only a portion of the governmental payer’s 
lifetime expenditures on behalf of an individual are typically related to the 
settlement, identifying the particular liens to be reimbursed from the 
settlement funds at issue often involves negotiations between the individual 
(or his/her agent) and the governmental entity.  As a result, an occupation 
known as a Lien Resolution Administrator (LRA) now exists.
 
113
Settlement agreements sometimes contain statements or provisions 
relating to liability for the LRA’s charges.  Before discussing them, 
however, some background information is required.  In particular, one must 
know who—the defendant, the plaintiff, or the plaintiffs’ attorney—would 
bear the cost of resolving third-party liens if no LRA were hired.  As 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, there is no default rule.  The parties 
must allocate the expense.
  As the 
name implies, LRAs specialize in dealing with lienholders.  Because LRAs 
charge for this service, it is important to know who is responsible for 
paying them. 
114
 
Master Settlement Agreement], available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/
documents/Master%20Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf.  The lien-resolution 
requirements set out in mass tort settlement agreements in recent years typically include 
commitments by plaintiffs’ counsel that they:  (1) will conduct a “reasonable investigation” 
into the existence of any liens of such governmental authorities “resulting from or arising out 
of” the plaintiff’s injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant and/or its product; 
(2) will ensure that any such liens are satisfied from the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds; (3) 
will confirm with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services whether a Medicare Set 
Aside (MSA) must be established and funded from the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds; (4) 
will not release any settlement funds to the client until they either (a) have written 
confirmation that the client is not subject to any governmental liens or MSA, or (b) have 
written confirmation of the amount of any potentially applicable lien and/or MSA and 
withhold that amount from the settlement funds released to the client; (5) will provide the 
defendant a Certificate of Compliance that formally acknowledges satisfaction and discharge 
of any governmental liens and the funding of any MSA relating to the client’s settlement 
proceeds; and (6) will indemnify the defendant if the governmental authority contends, after 
the release of the settlement funds to the claimant, that additional monies are owed it in 
connection with a lien or MSA involving those settlement funds.  In addition, these 
settlement agreements often include similar requirements regarding “other liens,” which are 
commonly defined as liens held by third-party payors other than “Government Authority 
Third Party Providers/Payors.” See, e.g., id. §§ 12.1.1, 12.1.3, 12.1.5. 
  But as between the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s 
 112. See, e.g., id. § 12.1. 
 113. See, e.g., id. §§ 12.1, 17.1.49. 
 114. Depending on the relevant jurisdiction’s default rule governing the allocation of this 
expense as between the plaintiff’s attorney and the client, however, it may be problematic if 
the defendant agrees to bear this expense. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.  
Consider a situation in which the Ohio Ethics Opinion would govern. See Supreme Court of 
Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2009-9 [hereinafter Ohio Ethics 
Opinion 2009-9].  If the defendant is only interested in paying $1,000,000 total in settlement, 
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attorney, the few relevant advisory ethics opinions have held that, with rare 
exception, the plaintiffs’ lawyers must provide lien resolution services 
(directly or indirectly) and may not charge the client extra for them.115  
When these ethics opinions govern, contingent-fee attorneys who choose to 
outsource their lien resolution responsibilities to an LRA may pass the 
expense on to their clients only under specified, stringent circumstances.116
When viewed in the context of this default rule, statements in a 
settlement agreement regarding who will pay the fees and expenses of an 
LRA raise intriguing questions about the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fiduciary 
duties.  By itself, a statement in the settlement agreement that the defendant 
shall not be responsible for the fees or expenses of the LRA is 
unproblematic.  The defendant has an obvious interest in keeping the total 
cost of the settlement as low as possible.  Consequently, the defendant may 
decline to pay the expenses of lien resolution while also requiring that any 
relevant liens be properly resolved. 
 
What if a group settlement agreement specifies that an LRA’s fees will 
be paid from the total “Settlement Sum”?  If interpreted to mean that the 
LRA’s fees are to be paid “off the top” of the gross settlement amount, this 
provision would result in all settling clients sharing in the cost of the LRA 
in proportion to their gross settlement amounts, and without regard to 
whether a particular client had any qualifying liens to be resolved.  
Admittedly, some advisory opinions permit separate charges to the clients 
 
for example, an agreement under which the defendant pays $900,000 in gross settlements 
and pays $100,000 in LRA fees arguably benefits the plaintiffs’ attorneys at the expense of 
the clients relative to an agreement that paid $1,000,000 total in gross settlements and left 
the LRA fees to be paid pursuant to the default rule set out in the Ohio Ethics Opinion. 
 115. See Maryland State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 01-01 [hereinafter 
Md. Ethics Opinion 01-01]; Maryland State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 02-
02 [hereinafter Md. Ethics Opinion 02-02]; NYCLA Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 739 
(July 10, 2008) [hereinafter NYC Ethics Opinion 739]; Ohio Ethics Opinion 2009-9, supra 
note 114. 
 116. The consensus of the two most recent ethics opinions is that fees for outsourced lien 
resolution services may properly be charged against the net proceeds of a contingent fee 
personal injury client only if all of the following conditions are met: 
 (i) The original retainer agreement with the client provides that the attorney may 
engage an outside firm for lien resolution and that the fee for that service will be 
charged as a disbursement. 
 (ii) A valid lien against the individual client’s settlement proceeds is determined to 
exist. 
 (iii) The total of (a) the fee charged by the lien resolution firm plus (b) the lien 
amount paid by the client is less than the original, pre-negotiated lien amount, 
resulting in a documented, net financial benefit to the individual client. 
  (iv) The amount charged to the client for the lien resolution service is the actual 
amount charged by the provider of that service and is reasonable. 
See Ohio Ethics Opinion 2009-9, supra note 114 at 3; NYC Ethics Opinion 739, supra note 
115, at 4–7.  It is not clear that either of the Maryland ethics opinions would permit fees for 
outsourced lien resolution services to be charged to the clients even under these 
circumstances. See Md. Ethics Opinion 02-02, supra note 115; Md. Ethics Opinion 01-01, 
supra note 115.  We are not aware of any applicable ethics opinion of a state bar or ABA 
committee that states a view contrary to those set forth in the Maryland, New York County, 
and Ohio ethics opinions. 
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for LRA fees when certain conditions are met.117  In a group settlement of 
any size, however, these conditions are unlikely to be met by all 
participating claimants.  For example, some claimants may have qualifying 
liens that require resolution by the LRA, but others may not.  Some 
claimants may have signed retainer agreements with their attorneys that 
permit LRA fees to be taken “off the top” but some may not have.118
By negotiating a settlement agreement that requires at least some clients 
to pay LRA fees that the plaintiffs’ attorneys seem to be obligated to pay 
themselves under the default rule, do the plaintiffs’ attorneys breach a 
fiduciary duty to those clients?
  
Consequently, a blanket settlement provision requiring that LRA fees be 
defrayed by all settling claimants is likely to be objectionable. 
119
Is the conflict between the clients and their attorney that is created by the 
settlement agreement provision regarding the payment of LRA fees 
distinguishable from the potential attorney-client conflicts discussed in 
Parts II.A and II.B?  We believe that it is.  For us, the critical question is 
whether the potential conflict involved an increase in the client’s total 
attorneys’ fees and expenses above that agreed to in the client’s original 
retainer agreement with the attorney.  The scenarios discussed in Parts II.A 
and II.B involved potential reductions in attorneys’ fees below those agreed 
to when the client originally retained the attorney.  The controversial 
  To be sure, the provision regarding LRA 
fees effectively increased the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ revenue from the overall 
settlement, and did so at the expense of their clients.  But under the analysis 
of this Article, that fact alone is not determinative.  We argued in Part II.A 
that it is not a breach of an attorney’s fiduciary obligations to a client to 
challenge a court’s sua sponte order reducing the attorney’s contractual fee, 
even though a successful challenge would benefit the attorney at the 
expense of the client.  We similarly contended in Part II.B that a contingent-
fee attorney’s fiduciary obligations do not mandate, other things being 
equal, that the attorney file the client’s case in the jurisdiction with court 
rules that provide the client the greatest reduction in the attorney’s 
contractual fee. 
 
 117. See supra note 116. 
 118. In most group settlements, the LRA is retained solely to resolve liens held by 
governmental authority third-party payors, such as Medicare, Medicaid, the U.S. Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs, the U.S. Department of Defense, TRICARE, and the Indian Health 
Services. See, e.g., Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 111, at §§ 12.1.2, 
17.1.34.  In most group settlements, a substantial portion of the covered claimants will not 
have liens from any of these entities.  Any liens held by private health insurers are typically 
addressed in the settlement agreement solely though a promise by the settling client, and 
sometimes also the plaintiff’s attorney, to independently resolve any such liens and to 
indemnify the defendant against any residual liability. See, e.g., id. § 12.1.5. 
 119. Such a provision in a settlement agreement would be of questionable enforceability 
to the extent that it would result in the payment of attorneys’ fees and/or expenses by the 
client that are considered excessive or unethical. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), (c) (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04(a), 
(b), (d) (2005).  For purposes of this Article, however, we can put to one side the question of 
whether, in light of the default rule, such a provision in the settlement agreement would be 
enforceable if challenged. 
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actions taken by the plaintiffs’ attorneys in those contexts, even if 
successful, would not result in revenue to the attorneys in excess of those 
specified in the original retainer agreement; they would simply ensure that 
the attorneys received that contractual amount.  Language in the settlement 
agreement specifying that LRA fees be paid from the total “Settlement 
Sum,” however, if interpreted to mean that the LRA’s fees are to be paid 
“off the top” of the gross settlement amount, would increase the revenue to 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys above the amount to which they would be entitled 
under the original contract with the client or under the default rule.  In 
addition to receiving the contractual fees plus the contractual expense 
reimbursements, this language would have the attorneys also receive 
reimbursement from their clients for a substantial portion of the LRA fees, 
revenue to which the attorneys are not entitled under either the original 
retainer agreement or the likely default rule.120
It is further useful to consider how language regarding the payment of 
LRA fees that is favorable to the plaintiffs’ attorneys might come to be 
included in a settlement agreement.  One can only speculate about the 
underlying facts in any given situation, given the confidentiality of 
settlement negotiations.  Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, it is not 
surprising that the defendant would want to make explicit that it would be 
paying no part of the LRA fees.  Equally surely, however, the defendant has 
no interest in whether the claimants, their counsel, or some combination of 
the two will be paying those fees.  How then might language that is 
favorable to the plaintiffs’ attorneys regarding the payment of LRA fees 
come to be included in a settlement agreement?  One possibility is that the 
favorable language is provided by the defendant, as part of a clumsy 
attempt simply to protect itself from any responsibility for those fees, but 
without regard to the implications for the plaintiffs’ attorneys of the precise 
language provided.
 
121
Another possibility is that the plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest the language, 
using their control of settlement negotiations with the defendant to attempt 
to contract around the likelihood that payment of the LRA’s fees are the 
responsibility of the attorneys and not of their clients.  But, of course, the 
defendant could not be expected to be a zealous bargaining agent on behalf 
of the clients against their own attorneys on this issue, since the defendant 
 
 
 120. We term this the “likely” default rule because only three jurisdictions have explicitly 
considered the issue. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.  The fact that the three 
ethics opinions to date are substantially consistent in their holdings makes it more likely, in 
our view, that the remaining jurisdictions would follow their lead on this issue. 
 121. Under this scenario, the plaintiffs’ attorneys could not be accused of using their 
settlement negotiations with the defendant to secure an improper benefit for themselves at 
the expense of their clients, since the plaintiffs’ attorneys did not propose the language to the 
defendant.  Any breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the plaintiffs’ attorneys would 
arguably arise subsequently if they sought to pass the LRA fees on to their clients in 
violation of the applicable default rule.  Again, the defendant should be entirely indifferent 
as to whether the plaintiffs or the plaintiffs’ attorneys ultimately pay the LRA fees so long as 
the defendant remains free from any responsibility to pay the fees. 
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simply has no reason to care whether the clients or their counsel are 
ultimately responsible for paying the LRA’s fees. 
An analogous situation has been discussed extensively in the literature on 
settlement bargaining over class counsel’s fees in class actions.  When a 
defendant controls the amount class counsel is paid, the defendant can offer 
“red-carpet treatment on fees” in return for favorable terms elsewhere.122  
In other words, the defendant can trade higher fees for lower relief for the 
class.  Class counsel is willing to play along because class counsel receives 
the fee, not the relief.  Courts and commentators have highlighted this 
conflict repeatedly.123  Professor John C. Coffee has framed it as a problem 
of “structural collusion” in which class counsel and a defendant naturally 
settle on terms that are good for the negotiators but bad for the class.124
Structural collusion of a similar sort would occur if plaintiffs’ attorneys 
attempted to use settlement negotiations to “contract around” the fee and 
expense provisions in their retainer agreements with their clients.  The 
plaintiffs’ attorneys want the increased revenue.  Because putting some (or 
all) of the responsibility for the LRA’s fees on the plaintiffs, rather than 
their attorneys, costs the defendant nothing, the defendant is presumably 
happy to offer the plaintiffs’ attorneys “red-carpet treatment on LRA fees” 
in return for other things, such as a smaller settlement fund, a later funding 
date, or a higher participation threshold.
 
125
 
 122. Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991); see also 
In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 728 (3d Cir. 2001). 
  An exchange that is mutually 
 123. Multiple judicial decisions have condemned the conflict. See, e.g., Zucker v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A client who employs a 
lawyer to litigate against a third party has a legitimate interest in having his lawyer refrain 
from taking the third party’s money in exchange for throwing the fight.”).  Academic 
commentary likewise abounds. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney:  The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 (1986) (“Often, the plaintiff’s 
attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the 
plaintiffs.  At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap 
settlement for a high award of attorney’s fees.”); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the 
Guardians?  A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 42–
43 (2002) (discussing the various forms sweetheart deals can take in class actions and mass 
tort cases); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without 
Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 145 (2001) (describing class action practice as “a 
world in which lawyers make fabulous fees for achieving very little,” while “defendant-
corporations make sweetheart deals to dispose of serious liability at bargain-basement 
rates”); Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling:  The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust 
Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2008) (“Self-interested class counsel 
are willing to settle on the cheap in exchange for generous attorneys’ fees.”); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 933 (1996) 
(observing that class counsel can “entice defendants to reduce their total payments by 
providing counsel with generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the class”). 
 124. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action:  A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 
IND. L.J. 625, 647–48 (1987) (describing how opportunities for structural collusion arise in 
class actions); Coffee, Jr., supra note 123, at 718. 
 125. The defendant might be less happy to give the plaintiffs’ attorneys the self-serving 
language regarding LRA fees if that language were likely both to be held unenforceable and 
to render the entire settlement agreement unenforceable.  However, mass tort settlement 
agreements typically include a provision that provides that the remainder of the agreement 
will be enforceable even if any provision is determined to be “invalid, illegal, or 
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advantageous for the negotiators occurs naturally.  When secrecy makes it 
difficult for non-participants to monitor negotiations, as typically is true in 
mass tort settlements, the conflict is especially “pronounced.”126
It is important to note that if plaintiffs’ attorneys use their control of 
settlement negotiations with the defendant to attempt to contract around the 
likelihood that payment of the LRA’s fees are the responsibility of the 
attorneys and not of their clients, they potentially cost their clients more 
than the amount of those fees.  Although the defendant does not 
independently care whether the plaintiffs’ attorneys or their clients pay the 
LRA’s fees and might eventually agree to whatever the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
request on this issue, we also assume that the defendant would rationally 
withhold its consent until offered a concession.  Because the negotiations 
occur in secret, one can only speculate on what, if anything, the claimants in 
such circumstances might give up in order for their attorneys to secure the 
defendant’s consent to language that would provide the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
revenue in excess of that provided in the attorney-client retainer 
agreements.
  Only 
persons not at the bargaining table are harmed, and in the context of mass 
tort settlements, those persons typically include the plaintiffs. 
127
In sum, there is no reason for issues involving the allocation of the gross 
settlement proceeds between the plaintiffs and their attorneys to be included 
in the settlement negotiations between the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the 
defendant.  Matters of interest only to claimants and their lawyers should be 
addressed in negotiations in which only they are involved.  The focus of the 
defendant in settlement negotiations should be on their liability to the 
claimants and other matters in which the defendant has a legitimate interest, 
such as the scope of the release.  Similarly, the plaintiffs’ lawyers should 
enter into settlement negotiations with a single goal:  getting the most 
money possible for their clients.  By maximizing the total recovery, 
  It is certain, however, that by expressing their desire for the 
defendant’s help, the plaintiffs’ attorneys give the defendant greater 
leverage in the settlement negotiations.  Presumably, that leverage will be 
employed. 
 
unenforceable in any jurisdiction.”  And such a “severability” provision obviously gives a 
defendant much less reason to be concerned about the enforceability of the provision 
regarding the payment of LRA fees. 
It should also be noted that if language regarding LRA fees in a settlement agreement is 
unenforceable insofar as that language would increase the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ revenue 
beyond that permitted by the client’s contract with the attorney or permitted under the likely 
default rule, plaintiffs’ attorneys have less incentive to seek (or sign off on) such language.  
Of course, that incentive may be diminished further if financial penalties, in addition to the 
foregone revenue increase, would result from a successful challenge to the provision.  In at 
least some jurisdictions, such penalties are available when an attorney is found to have 
breached a fiduciary duty to a client. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. 
1999).  In addition, of course, the attorney faces negative publicity and a likely loss of good 
will in the event of such a challenge, whether or not it is ultimately successful. 
 126. In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 912 (D.C. 2002). 
 127. If a client were to sue the plaintiffs’ attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty with 
regard to the LRA fees language in the settlement agreement, we would expect the client to 
be able to learn the origin of that language in discovery. 
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contingent-fee lawyers also maximize their fee.  The harmony of interest 
between the lawyer and the client is substantial.  The lawyers’ fees and 
expense reimbursements also fall out automatically.  When the defendant 
pays the agreed sum, the lawyer receives the expense reimbursements and 
percentage fee agreed to in the engagement contract.  When plaintiffs’ 
lawyers invite, or permit, the defendant to be involved in matters of interest 
only to the claimants and their lawyers, they inevitably and unnecessarily 
provide the defendant an opportunity to play those attorneys off against 
their own clients and thereby to undermine the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ 
representation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have undertaken a preliminary exploration of the 
boundary that separates matters to which lawyers’ fiduciary duties apply 
from other matters to which they do not.  By examining three recent puzzles 
that arise in connection with the representation of plaintiffs by lawyers who 
charge contingent fees, we have sought to identify a principled basis for 
distinguishing an attorney’s self-interested conduct that violates the 
fiduciary duty from similar conduct that is a proper assertion of a 
contractual payment right.  We have proposed that one begin by examining 
the reasonable expectations of clients and attorneys, and that the attorney-
client retainer agreement therefore trumps the common law fiduciary duty 
on matters to which the agreement properly applies.  Many questions 
remain, however, including how to decide whether an action that enriches a 
lawyer connects in an appropriate way to an enumerated contract right and, 
more generally, how far lawyers can go when using contractual provisions 
to carve out areas in which they may consider their own interests.  We hope 
that the tentative thoughts set out in this Article might persuade others of 
the importance of the issues involved, and encourage further research and 
discussion. 
